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The “Uberisation” of work – the increasing use of digital platforms by self-
employed service providers – is often seen as a pathway into precarious 
employment in rich countries. In Africa, quite the opposite may be true: the 
rise of digital platforms offers new opportunities for informal entrepreneurs 
to become more productive, and eventually formalise.
 • Digitalisation in Africa is happening on a scale and at a pace that many would 
not have anticipated. Digital platforms – such as Uber, Airbnb, and local varie-
ties – are spreading. At the same time, most African economies are character-
ised by the pervasive informality of firms and employment.
 • Informality is high because formalisation does not pay for firms. Digitalisation 
is likely to affect both the costs and benefits of formalising. Digital platforms 
can increase firm and worker productivity, for example through better market 
access, and they also provide an entry point for formalising firms.
 • The Uberisation – and formalisation – of employment could be beneficial to the 
many African self-employed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that self-employed 
drivers registered on a digital platform, for example, have higher earnings than 
“conventional” taxi ones. Customers can benefit from better services and lower 
prices, and governments can raise their capacity to generate tax revenue using 
information from online platforms and digital transactions.
 • Overall, the positive effects of digital platforms seem to outweigh the negative 
ones. At the same time, adjustment costs – as evident in the protests by estab-
lished taxi drivers witnessed in many countries – need to be addressed and 
mitigated.
Policy Implications
There is very limited empirical evidence on the effects of digitalisation in general, 
and of digital platforms in particular, in Africa. Such research is urgently needed 
to harness the potential of new technologies for inclusive economic development. 
Digital platforms can contribute to formalising economies and improving tax 
collection in Africa. Smart policies and regulation need to achieve these ends 
without inhibiting innovation and technology adoption. 
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Digitalisation in Africa amid Pervasive Informality 
Digitalisation, understood as the transformation of economies and societies in-
duced by digital technologies, is changing people’s lives and behaviour around the 
world, including in Africa – where this transformation is taking place on a scale and 
at a pace many would not have anticipated. The share of the population owning a 
mobile phone has quickly climbed to 45 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and 
one-quarter uses mobile Internet (GsmA 2019). African countries pioneered mo-
bile payment systems that have boosted financial inclusion across the continent and 
which are now spreading to other regions of the world. Hundreds of thousands of 
entrepreneurs use Uber, Airbnb, and similar digital platforms to offer their services, 
which are used by millions of customers. Finally, there are vibrant tech start-up 
scenes in some places, most notably in Lagos, Nairobi, and South Africa. This start-
up scene has received quite some attention in development policy circles (there 
are now 618 tech hubs on the African continent; bayen and Giuliani 2018), but it 
is digital platforms that could have the most important impacts on people’s liveli-
hoods and SSA’s labour markets.
These developments, however, are taking place in an economic environment 
generally characterised by relatively modest overall economic growth, little struc-
tural change, and, in particular, the pervasive informality of firms and employment. 
A recent report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) confirmed that 
employment in ssA is still overwhelmingly small-scale and informal. more than 
80 per cent of employment is in enterprises with less than ten employees, and the 
self-employed working without any employees alone make up 50 per cent of total 
employment (see Figure 1 below). In a country like Côte d’Ivoire, more than 90 per 
cent of employment is in the informal sector (ILO 2019). While these findings are 
hardly surprising, the new, more accurate data basis lends fresh urgency to shining 
a spotlight on the self-employed and very small businesses – as key factors in gen-
erating productive employment at scale in SSA. 
The vast majority of the self-employed as well as micro and small firms are informal – 
that is, not formally registered with the authorities, in particular for tax purposes. 
Informal employment is mainly understood as being employed without a contract, 
and can – in principle – be in both formal and informal firms. Informal employees 
generally have no legal security or protection from exploitation and abuse, inade-
quate and volatile earnings, as well as no access to healthcare and social security. As 
informal firms, informal workers do not pay taxes. This implies that the prevalence 
Figure 1 
Employment Share 
of the Self-Employed 
and Different Firm 
Size Classes, by  
Region (%)
Source: ILO 2019. 
Note: eAP = east Asia 
and the Pacific;  
eCA = europe and Cen-
tral Asia;  
LAC = Latin America and 
the Carribean;  
meNA = middle east and 
North Africa;  
sA = south Asia; ssA = 
sub-Saharan Africa.
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of non-registered firms and self-employment has major implications for collecting 
taxes and mobilising domestic public resources.
It is noteworthy that rising incomes, urbanisation, and the associated decline 
of employment in agriculture has not been associated with a decline in informality 
in SSA. This is because industrial output and employment have been more or less 
stagnant, with non-agricultural employment being created almost exclusively in the 
service sector – where small-scale informal enterprises prevail. [1] 
Why African Firms Do Not Formalise despite Lower Business 
Registration Costs
Informality may constrain firm growth and success. Potential formalisation benefits 
for firms could arise from improved access to credit, greater scope for marketing 
and engaging with larger firms and the government, a lower risk of being fined, and 
better access to (government) training and support programmes (bruhn and mc-
Kenzie 2014). For dependent workers, their firm’s formal status may lead to better 
employment conditions – including a formal contract or even access to social secur-
ity. Finally, the government may hope for increased tax collection from informal 
firms. Yet, despite considerable efforts on the part of African governments to sim-
plify registration procedures for firms – as Figure 2 below illustrates, the average 
number of days to register a business in SSA has halved over the past ten years – the 
share of unregistered firms remains stubbornly high. 
The main reason why these formalisation policies have typically failed to increase 
the number of registered businesses is that the benefits of formalising are perceived 
as small by governments and firms alike. For governments, the revenue potential 
of formalising and taxing small, informal firms is very limited, and may even be 
outstripped by the high costs of tax collection per firm. simplified approaches, such 
as presumptive taxes assuming a certain income rather than relying on income dec-
larations, are somewhat effective in reducing costs for both sides but run the risk 
of placing a relatively high tax burden on the smallest firms. empirical evidence 
on the impacts of different types of formalisation policy on firm registration shows 
that most interventions – for example reducing the amount of time and money 
1 Sectoral employment 
shares in the recent ILO re-
port (2019) do not fully re-
flect this statement, as the 
service sector also covers 
government services. 
Employment in the latter 
is by definition formal and 
in large-scale institutions, 
thus inflating the numbers 
in the report. According to 
information from the Africa 
Sector Database, the share 
of government services in 
total employment ranges 
from 5 to 15 per cent (de 
Vries, Timmer, and de Vries 
2015). 
Figure 2 
Average Time to Start 
a Business (Days), 
SSA versus OECD 
High-Income
Source: World Bank 
2019. 
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that firms spend on registration, or providing information on how to register – are 
not sufficient to motivate firms to register (bruhn and mcKenzie 2014; Jessen and 
Kluve 2019). For informal firms, the perceived benefits of formalisation – such as 
access to government services, or improved access to credit – are often uncertain, 
and insufficient to compensate for registration costs, subsequent tax payments, or 
even harassment by public authorities. 
Digital Platforms Can Make Formalisation Worthwhile
Given that firms’ formalisation decisions and governments’ formalisation efforts 
largely come down to a cost–benefit assessment, digitalisation has the potential to 
boost formalisation rates among the self-employed and small firms by cutting costs 
and enhancing benefits. As digitalising tax administration can make collecting rev-
enues much cheaper, it may become worthwhile for governments to target smaller 
firms – where monitoring costs previously exceeded expected tax revenues. Digital 
platforms connecting small-scale entrepreneurs to an online market can serve as 
the entry point for governments to get firms registered.
At the same time, firms’ perceived benefits from formalisation may rise substan-
tially if getting registered comes as a package deal with improved (online) market 
access, thus motivating even small firms to seek tax registration. Digital platforms 
can potentially play an important role in many key activities of the informal sector, 
such as retail, transport, or domestic services. In these activities, digital platforms 
may not only offer the benefit of a larger customer base but possibly also improved 
contract enforcement (e.g. through customer ratings and smooth payments) – thus 
addressing a key challenge for small businesses. On top of that, the digital recording 
of business transactions would not only mean better accounting practices but also 
imply that income declarations for tax purposes could easily be produced. more 
precise income estimates can result in less unintended regressive taxation for the 
smallest firms. 
A similar argument can be made for the formalisation of labour and access to 
social security. While tax-financed, non-contributory social transfer programmes 
have recently become more common throughout the developing world, such 
schemes are still the exception in ssA and typically target particularly vulnerable 
groups (Dodlova, Giolbas, and Lay 2018). In many African countries, government-
run, contributory social security programmes cater to a minority of formal em-
ployees. The self-employed and smaller businesses could, in principle, participate 
voluntarily in these programmes, but mostly lack the financial stability to do so. 
Digitalisation could change the rationale to sign up for contributory social security, 
but only if earnings increased, contributions were reduced, and procedures to enrol 
and make claims were simplified. 
“Uberisation” as a Stepping Stone in Highly Informal Economies
In principle the business model of digital platforms, which typically relies on small, 
self-employed service providers, fits well with a large number of such enterprises. 
This explains the select successes of app-based online platforms especially in the 
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service sector. In the transport one, digital platforms connecting self-employed 
drivers to customers have rapidly gained ground. Uber is now active in eight African 
countries, 24 cities, and has more than 60,000 active drivers according to company 
information; its rival bolt (formerly Taxify) is active in 44 cities and six countries 
of the continent. There are various similar start-ups catering to local markets, such 
as the motorcycle taxi app safeboda in Kenya and Uganda. e-commerce platforms 
are spreading across the continent. Jumia, also dubbed the “African Amazon,” now 
connects buyers and sellers in 14 African countries, and has 500,000 merchants 
registered on its platform. In Kenya, one of the most advanced African countries in 
terms of digital innovation, there are now online platforms for services as diverse 
as artisanal work, homecare and cleaning services, and micro-task work in the in-
formation technology sector.
Despite the widespread criticism of “Uberisation” in the transport sector, 
meaning the reliance of ride-hailing platforms on self-employed drivers who lack 
work contracts and social security, such an individual registered on a digital plat-
form (henceforth, “platform driver”) may be better off than his or her taxi driver 
counterpart. This is because the platform driver has more potential customers and 
spends less time waiting or searching for them, thus also saving fuel. Prices are set 
and adhered to; contractual risks are reduced. Further, customer and driver rating 
systems reduce potential conflicts over routes and fares. With regard to job and 
legal security, as well as access to social protection, the platform driver and the taxi 
driver are likely to be roughly on a par in most SSA cities. Unfortunately, there is 
thus far no systematic empirical evidence regarding earning differences between 
the two groups. Anecdotal evidence from Accra suggests that Uber drivers can earn 
three times as much as taxi ones. 
However such anecdotal evidence may be misleading, as looking at high weekly 
earnings obscures the fact that it often takes 16-hour days to realise such lofty in-
comes. Also, platform drivers are at the mercy of their companies’ price-setting de-
cisions, and superior earnings may not necessarily remain so in the medium term. 
ever-expanding numbers of platform drivers as well as fierce competition with both 
established taxi operators and other ride-hailing platforms have driven the earn-
ings of Uber drivers down in previous years. A case study of the Nairobi market 
by the Center for Global Development shows that Uber’s kilometre fare halved be-
tween 2015 and 2018, prompting two (relatively unsuccessful) waves of protest by 
the company’s drivers in 2017 (Zollman and Ng’weno 2018). Still, being a platform 
driver compares favourably to many other jobs in the earnings dimension, as such 
individuals can earn as much as the monthly wage of a medium-skilled worker in a 
single week if using their own car. [2] being a platform driver is also not significantly 
worse than most other jobs in the non-earnings dimension, as the overwhelming 
majority of jobs in ssA – at least in current circumstances – do not offer formal so-
cial security. In terms of informal insurance, the picture is not yet clear. Taxi drivers 
who belong to taxi stations in Accra, for instance, are often organised into groups 
that may also serve as informal savings and insurance networks; platform drivers 
are on their own, meanwhile. At the same time, platform drivers may still have ac-
cess to other informal networks and have any shortfalls be partly compensated for 
by higher incomes. 
While there is ongoing discussion around the effects of digital platforms on 
financial inclusion, a thorough assessment of the overall welfare effects of ride-
2 In Ghana, a medium-
skilled worker earns GHS 
705–1,090 (EUR 116–179; 
Oct 2019) monthly on 
average, according to cal-
culations based on survey 
data from wageindicator.
org. While the average 
earnings of Uber drivers 
are not published by the 
company, estimations 
suggest weekly earnings of 
GHS 1,000–1,500 (see, for 
example, Morttey 2018).
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hailing platforms remains to be done; it would have to look beyond the effects on 
driver earnings, and working conditions. It is very obvious that the presence of Uber 
and others has exerted acute competitive pressure on established taxi companies 
and drivers (as well as on operators of other transport modes too). Violent protests 
against “unfair competition” by incumbent taxi operators in Nairobi and Johannes-
burg bear witness to this. However, these protests may not necessarily be in the best 
interests of the population at large. Customers benefit from lower fare prices and 
will mostly appreciate knowing the identity of the driver, for example for security 
reasons. 
An important question in an assessment of the welfare impacts of ride-hailing 
platforms would be where exactly they recruit their drivers from: are old jobs trans-
formed or destroyed, are new ones created? Again, systematic knowledge is lacking. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that drivers come partly from the informal 
sector, partly from among the unemployed, but also partly from the realm of the 
formally employed. New entrants thus threaten the jobs of established drivers, as 
new technologies disrupt the transport sector. The importance of knowing Accra’s 
roads and landmarks by heart wanes considerably, while the abilities to operate the 
app, read a map, and navigate accordingly become vital skills. While public opinion 
may often tend to side with the incumbent, in this case the established taxi driver, 
it is not immediately clear that he or she should be protected against the entry of 
a formerly unemployed person. At the same time, upholding a level playing field 
means that regulations need to apply to platform drivers and taxi drivers alike – 
which is often not the case. Another important question is whether being a platform 
driver can be a stepping stone towards other, even more productive activities, or 
even a fully formalised business. Success stories of platform drivers who managed 
to grow their fleet to multiple cars in a matter of years suggest that this potential 
exists, but it is too early to assess the effects in the medium to long term. 
Overall, it seems that the positive effects experienced by many are likely to 
outweigh the negative ones for the few. The adverse consequences will, in fact, be 
concentrated on a single group of people: established taxi drivers with difficulties 
to use and adjust to the new technologies. Similar challenges may arise in other 
sectors such as the retail and hospitality ones, albeit losses are likely to be less 
concentrated. Yet, we should emphasise once again that a comprehensive and solid 
empirical analysis that would allow for definite conclusions on the socio-economic 
implications of the rise of digital platforms in Africa remains to be conducted.
Digitalisation and Taxation
Digital platforms are not only impacting on service providers and customers, how-
ever. They also matter for governments and tax collection. To stick with the Uber 
example, the established taxi driver generates government revenue by paying for a 
taxi licence. Instead the platform driver – at least under most current regulations, 
or in practice – does not have such a licence, but rather pays fees to the platform 
operator – often a foreign company. This is clearly not an ideal situation from a 
regulatory and tax revenue perspective. Governments and regulations in rich and 
poor countries alike need to adapt to new technologies and harness their opportuni-
ties. These exist for tax registration and collection too.
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Regarding digital platforms, the main challenge for governments often is to get 
their operators to cooperate – for example by requiring government registration 
when signing up to a platform, or by making sharing data compulsory to support 
tax collection. The Kenyan authorities, for example, have repeatedly clarified that 
drivers on ride-hailing platforms are liable to pay income tax and VAT, and are cur-
rently wrestling with Uber to get the company to disclose information on its drivers 
in order to enforce this requirement. Uber, meanwhile, is citing data protection rea-
sons for not sharing information on the drivers on its platform, and generally does 
not accept any liability for their tax compliance. As the platform business model 
relies on low levels of regulation and government levies, foreign companies have 
very little incentive to cooperate voluntarily – while African governments have little 
leverage to force them to. 
beyond platforms, digitalisation offers a number of other opportunities to 
 widen the tax base, improve compliance, and decrease the costs of tax collection in 
highly informal economies. Kenya, with its burgeoning information and commu-
nications technology sector and mobile money transactions there being equivalent 
to almost half of the country’s gross domestic product, has emerged as an African 
pioneer in the field of digital taxation. Its iTax system, introduced in 2013, allows 
users to pay all taxes and manage their accounts online. It was complemented in 
2014 by the KRA-m system, which allows for tax payments via mobile money. both 
systems have simplified tax registration and payments for citizens, while also de-
livering significant reductions in the cost of tax collection for the authorities too 
(Ndung’u 2017). 
Further, governments have started to target digital transactions through finan-
cial institutions, who are covered by financial sector regulation and hence obligated 
to cooperate. Kenya and Uganda recently introduced taxes on mobile money trans-
actions; Nigeria, meanwhile, has announced VAT will soon be charged on card pay-
ments for goods and services made through digital platforms. The drawbacks: both 
approaches create disincentives for digital payment, thus threatening the gains 
made in terms of financial inclusion (Ndung’u 2019); targeting consumption and 
transactions implies a higher relative tax burden for the poor as well. 
Policy Dilemmas: Harnessing the Potential of Digitalisation for 
Development without Compromising Innovation
Governments in Africa (and elsewhere) have a delicate task ahead of them. They 
want to harness the efficiency gains and tap the revenue potential that digital plat-
forms and the increasing number of digital transactions occurring offer. They also, 
simultaneously, do not want to choke off technological progress and innovation, in 
particular as adapted to local conditions. At the same time, they do not want to per-
mit technology firms to exploit the deficiencies in their regulatory environments or 
to undercut labour standards and social security necessities. This is a genuine risk, 
since a significant number of the business models utilised by digital platforms work 
best in unregulated markets. African governments will thus be faced with sensitive 
policy decisions. How, for example, to deal with a foreign company that refuses to 
cooperate in terms of enforcing regulation or sharing sales and earnings data so as 
to support tax collection? 
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In principle, digital platforms can contribute to formalising economies and im-
proving tax collection in Africa. The empirical evidence on formalisation efforts there 
and elsewhere very clearly shows that firms need to perceive the benefits of formalis-
ing. These gains can be enhanced when formalisation is linked to access to related 
digital platforms and to digital transactions, which might induce more self-employed 
entrepreneurs and small-scale firms to seek registration in the first place. However, 
great care should be taken in order not to dis-incentivise the use of these technolo-
gies – for example by taxing digital payments too heavily. There is good reason to 
believe that the earnings of entrepreneurs can be improved through their participa-
tion in digital platforms; more evidence is certainly needed on the welfare impacts of 
such platforms however, including especially the effects thereof on the incumbents. 
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